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Case No. 7770 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT V. TILLER, also known as ROBERT 
V. TILLIER, also known as .ROBERT V. 
SWANN, and MILDRED lVIOLINARI, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. NOR.TO~, 
Administrator of the Estate of CHARLES 
CARSON, also known as H. F. SWANN, 
also known as R. C. TILLER, also known as 
ROBERT C. TILLER, deceased, and THE 
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE 
CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation, and 
E. LeROY SHIELDS, as executor of the 
Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, 
and E. LeROY SHIELDS, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA NORTON, 
wife of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HA-
ZELRIGG and CATHEDRAL 0 F THE 
MAGDALENE CATHOLIC CHURCH of 
East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
a Is o know il as ROMAN CATHOLIC 
BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY, a corpora-
tion s.ole, 
Cross-Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS, 
EDITH M. HAZELRIGG and CATHEDRAL OF THE MAG-
DALENE CATHOLIC CHURCH of East South Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, also known as ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, a corporation sole. 
- ~~; ~- ~~·· E McCULLOUGH, 
.1 1 ; ... \JA~or '·· y for Cross-Defendant and Respond-
- - edt; dith M. Hazelrigg. 
fv1 r r 1 ', ~<~~;JOHN D. RICE, AND DEY, HOPPA UGH, MARK 
'" 
8 ""' "- ~ & JOHNSON, 
........ --- --- -----· -· -~·-··~· ~-·- -- A.:ttlo.r.ne.y for Cross-Defendant and Respond-
...... ..,'"k , I u p err! r·o~., · t etit .~ Cathedral of the Mag.dalene Catholic 
Church of E1ast South Temple, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, also known as Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Salt Lake City, a corporation sole. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT V. TILLER, also known· as ROBERT 
V. TILLIER, also known as ROBERT V. 
SWANN, and MILDRED MOLINARI, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. NORTON, 
Administrator of the Estate of CHARLES 
CARSON, also known as H. F. SWANN, 
also known as R. C. TILLER, also known as 
ROBERT C. TILLER, deceased, and THE 
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE 
CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation, and 
E. LeROY SHIELDS, as executor of the 
Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, 
and E. LeROY SHIELDS, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA NORTON, 
wife of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HA-
ZELRIGG and CATHEDRAL 0 F THE 
MAGDALENE CATHOLIC CHURCH of 
East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
also known as ROMAN CATHOLIC 
BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY, a corpora-
tion sole, 
Cross-Defendants and Respondents. 
FOREWORD 
Case No. 
7770 
Since this Brief has to do with the Cross-Complaint 
of the Defendant, The Employers Liability Assurance 
Corporation, Ltd., a corporation, against Edith M. Hazel-
rigg and Cathedral of the Magdalene Catholic Church, 
the said Cross-Complainant does not wish this argument 
advanced by the said Cross-Defendants in the main brief 
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of the Defendants, and therefore, the said Cross-Defend-
ants write this brief to argue the following points raised 
by the said Cross-Defendants on the pleadings and in the 
trial of the above entitled matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Cross-Complainant alleges in brief, In para-
graphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and, 8 of its Cross-Complaint, the basis 
of its cause of action against the said Cross-Defendants. 
The allegation is to the effect that the estate consisted 
solely of assets distributed to that estate from the estate 
of her husband, Charles Carson, deceased, and that the 
distributees knew that the property came to them from 
the estate of Charles Carson, deceased, and that they 
were fully advised of all the proGeedings, relations, fam-
ily, heirs and matters concerning and pertaining to the 
estate of Charles Carson, deceased, and that the Cross-
Defendants were aware that the Cross-Complainant had 
furnished a Bond to the Administrator of the, estate of 
Charles Carson, deceased, and that the Cross-Defend-
ants were aware of the rights and privileges of the said 
Cross Complainant to so follow and have applied, in 
accordance with the law, all of the property of Charles 
Carson, deceased. 
Then the Cross-Complainant alleges that if a judg-
ment is taken by the Plaintiffs against the said Cross-
Defendant, that the. said Cross-Complainant asserts its 
right, title and privilege, by way of subrogation directly, 
to the right,· title and interest to the estate of Charles 
Carson, deceased, in and to all property of said estate, 
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and its right of action for the a1nount received by the 
Cross-Defendants. 
The Cross-Con1plainant further asks that if it is 
called to account ·as Bonds1nan, that it 'vill look to the 
said Cross-Defendants to saYe the said Cross-Compla.in-
~t harmless· as to such Judg1nent, and furthe-r a.sks that 
the Cross-Defendants account for the money re.ceived, 
and to hold the Cross-Con1plainant harmless fron1 any 
liability arising out of, or in connection with the Bond 
executed by the Defendant and Cross-Complainant. 
To that pleading the Cross-Defendants made a 
~lotion to Strike, and a ~Iotion to Make More Definite 
and Certain and a ~lotion to Dismiss, all of which were 
denied. It is the contention of the said Cross-Defendants 
that this 'vas error and that the Supreme Court should 
decide that the said }lotions, and especially the Motion 
to Dismiss 'vere proper and should have been granted . 
..._-\fter the case was submitted, the said Cross-De-
fendants moved the above entitled Court to dismiss the 
Cross-Complainants action, as against them, on the 
grounds set forth in the (Transcript, Page 743-4-49). 
The Court ruled that said Motion was p.remature, (Tran-
script, Page 750). 
It is apparent from a reading of the Transcript 
that no evidence was offered at all on behalf of the Cross-
Complainant, to prove any of the allegations of the 
Cross-Complaint, as against the S'aid Cross-Defendants, 
and that the Motion was proper and timely and should 
have been granted. See also the objections of the said 
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Cross-Defendants to the introduction of testimony, 
(Transcript, Page 172). 
S.TATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE ESTATE 
OF GRACE CATHERINE CARSON, DECEASED, PROBATE 
FILE No. 31944, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, CANNOT BE ATTACKED COLLATER-
ALLY, SINCE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IS 
NOT ASSAILED, AND THE INVALIDITY OF THE DECREE 
DOES NOT APPEAR ON ITS FACE. 
POINT II. 
THAT SAID DECREE MAY BE ATTACKED ONLY IN 
AN EQUITABLE ACTION AND ~ A DIRECT ACTION 
AGAINST SAID DECREE ON A PLEADING AND SHOWING 
OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD. 
POINT III. 
THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS 
THE CROSS-COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
POINT IV. 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS, AS AGAINST THE SAID 
CROSS-COMPLAINANT, MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
CASE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The Brief of the Defendants, in the abo:ve. entitled 
matter, argues that the judgment of the Court should be 
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upheld because there \Ya.s no proof of extrinsic fraud 
sufficient to justify equitable relief from the Decree 
of Distribution, in the estate of Charles Carson, deceased . 
.... \nd to support that argu1nent, the Defendants, and 
especially The Employers Liability Assurance Corpora-
tion, Ltd., brief the la\v and argue that the Decree of 
Distribution cannot be set aside, because the· law requires 
a sho,ving of extrinsic fraud in the procuring of the 
Decree, or in the proceedings relative thereto, wherein 
the Complainant \Vas prevented from having a fair hear-
ing. The Cross-Defendants contend that that rule is 
even n1ore strongly in the favor of the said Cross-De-
fendants, both upon the pleadings and the ·facts as ad-
duced at the trial of this cause. This same rule precludes 
a collateral attack on the estate of Grace Catherine 
Carson, deceased, by attempting to have a trust imposed 
on the sum of money received by the distributees in the 
~latter of the Estate of Grace C;atherine Carson, de-
ceased. 
See F'arley vs. Davis, 10 Wash. 2d 62, 116 
P. 2d 2'63, 155 A.L.R. 1302. 
The rule is, that if there is no extrinsic fraud in the 
procuring of the Decree of Distribution, the Court can 
no more declare a trust on the property distributed to 
the distributees than it has the power to direct the pro-
bate Court to set aside its Decree. 
S·ee Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, 
Vol. 4, Section 117 6. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
POINT II. 
The pleading of the Cross-Complainant, by extreme 
reasoning, n1ight seem to indicate a desire to impose a 
trust upon the amount received by the distributees from 
the estate of Grace Catherine c·arson, deceased. If that 
is the case, the action must be brought directly against 
the Decree in said estate and not indirectly. 
· See First National Bank and Trust Company 
vs. Stonehouse, 67 N.D. 11, 269 N.W. 51; 
Clarke vs. Eureka County Bank, 116 Fed. 534; 
Clavey vs. Loney, 80 Cal. App. 20, 251 P. 232; 
Hewett vs. Linstead, 49 Cal. App. 2d 607, 122 
P. 2d 352; 
Kurtz vs. Ogden Canyon Sanitarium Com-
pany, 37 U. 313, 108 P. 14; 
Section 1170 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd 
Edition, Vol. 4. 
POINT III. 
It is apparent from a reading of the Cross-Com-
plaint that there is no allegation whatsoever of extrinsic 
fraud on the part of anyone in the Probate proceedings 
in the estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased and 
especially in the Decree of Distribution therein. The only 
allegation is that the devisees knew that the property 
coming to them, in effect, was from the estate of Charles 
Carson, deceased and were fully advised of the proceed-
ings, relations, family, heirs and matters concerning and 
pertaining to the estate of Charles Carson, deceased and 
the testimony and the matters pursuant to the estate· of 
Charles Carson, deceased; and that they knew that a 
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Bond had been placed by the Cross-l~on1plainant and asks 
that in case judgment is taken against the Cross-Coul-
plainant, that it have judg1uent against the Cross-
Defendants, and that they save hin1 harmless from any 
judgment. 
This Cross-Co1nplaint does not state any cause of 
action against the said Cross-Defendants, either in law 
or in equity, but especially does not state any cause 
of action for equitable relief against the Decree of Dis-
tribution in the estate of Grace Catherine· Carson, de-
ceased. In any event, there is nothing stated in said 
Cross-Complaint which 'vould warrant introduction of 
testimony for the granting of relief from said Decree of 
Distribution on the ground of extrinsic fraud and its 
procurement. Neither do said allegations warrant any 
judgment that the Cross-Defendants hold the Cross-
Complainant harmless because of the Plaintiffs' action. 
See Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, 
Sections 1176, 1177 and 1178. 
The Cross-Defendants respectfully point out that 
no action is brought by the Plaintiffs against the Execu-
tor of the estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased and 
there is no allegation that there has been a judgment 
entered against the Executor of the estate of Grace 
Catherine Carson, deceased. 
In any event, there is no direct attack in the matter 
of the estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, and 
the allegations in a matter involving the estate of 
Charles Carson, deceased, do not constitute such direct 
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attack, and said action, if anything, is an attempt to 
collaterally attack the Decree of Distribution in the 
matter of the estate, of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased. 
See Hewett vs. Linstead, 49 Cal. App. 2d 
607, 122 P. 2d 352; 
Section 1170 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd 
Edition, Vol. 4. 
POINT IV. 
Since there is no evidence in the record showing 
any fraud in connection with the estate of Grace Cath-
erine Carson, deceased, the Motion to Dismiss, as against 
the said Cross-Defendants, should have been granted, 
since they should not be required to be held to attend 
trials until the Cross-Complainant determines whether 
or not he will introduce evidence against them, and 
that, only when he has determined his position as against 
the plaintiffs. As Cross-Defendants, the Cross-Defen-
dants should not be required to expend money, time and 
energy in this matte-r. If the Cross-Complainant wishes 
to bring an action directly against the Decree, in the 
Matter of the Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, de-
ceased, and makes the proper allegations for equitable 
relief, in a proper, independent proceeding in said judg-
ment, then, of course, the present Cross-Defendants 
would be proper parties and would then be in a position 
to defend· such an attack on the Decree of Distribution, 
under which it is claimed they obtained certain money 
or ptope'rty. · 
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See: Frguson vs. Ferguson, ·58 Cal. App. 2d 
811, 137 P. 2d 735; 
Harrison vs. Cannon, ~font., 203 P. 2d 978; 
\\rhite's Estate, 69 Cal. App. 2d 749, 160 P. 
2d 20±; 
nioyes vs. Agee, 53 U. 360, 178 P. 753; 
Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, 
\-r ol. ±, Sections 1163, 11 ±2, and 1187; 
Rice's Estate, 111 U. 428, 182 P. 2d 111; 
Section 102-9-28, r'"tah Code Annotated, 1943; 
Section 102-12-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1943; 
In re: Evans, ±2 U. 382, 130 P. 217; 
In re: Howard's Estate, 159 P. 2d 586, at 
page 590, 108 U. 294; 
Farley vs. Davis, 10 Wash. 2d 62, 116 P. 2d 
263, 155 A.L.R. 1302 ; 
Davis vs. Seavey, 9~5 Wash. 57, 163 P. 35, An-
notated Cases 1918 D 314, 113 A.L.R. 1242; 
~Ioritz vs. Horsman, Mich., 9 N.W. 2d 868, 
147 A.L.R. 117; 
21 Am. Jur., Sections 486, 487, 488, and 490, 
pages 653-55 ; 
Good vs. Herr, 42 American Decisions 236; 
Chamberlin vs. Anderson, 195 Iowa 855, 190 
N.W. 501, 26 A.L.R. 957; 
Russell vs. Davison, 184 Okla. 606, 89 P. 2d 
352, 121 A.L.R. 1063 ; 
Purinton vs. Dyson, 8 Calif. 2d 322, 65 P. 
2d 777, 113 A.L.R. 1230 - 1235. 
CONCLUSION 
It is resp~tfully submitted that no evidence was 
offered as to extrinsic fraud, as against the Cross-Defen-
dants, mentioned or otherwise. 
That the Motion to Dismiss at the end of the trial 
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should have been granted as against the Cross-Com-
plainant, and that in any event, the Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint, as not stating a cause of action against 
the Cross-Defendants, Edith M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral 
of the Magdalene Catholic Church, should have been 
granted. 
It is very important that a ruling be made upon 
these issues raised by the Cross-Defendants, because 
in the event that the Plaintiffs prevail in this appeal, 
as against the Defendant and Cross-Complainant, the 
status of the named Cross-Defendants should be deter-
mined. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. VERNE McCULLOUGH, 
Attorney for Cross-Defendant, 
Edith M. Hazelrigg. 
JOHN D. RICE, AND D·EY, HOP-
p AUGH, MARK & JOHNSON, 
Attorney for Cross-Defendant, 
Cathedral of the Magdalene 
Catholic Church of East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
also known as Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Salt Lake City, a 
corporation soJe·. 
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